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the average monthly expenditure of participants.
The real money stakes used varied from approximately US$2.50 to US$lOO. This allows for a comparison of results of games played with drastically different stakes. The results show no evidence of Proposer behavior moving towards the game theory prediction as the stakes i n~r e a s e .~ Responders, however, do exhibit increased willingness to accept a given percentage offer in higher stakes games. Hypothetical games are also played. The results from these games differ significantly from the real money games. In particular, there are significantly more rejections of Proposer offers in the hypothetical games and significantly larger variance in behavior than is found in the real money games.
II. THE ULTIMATUM GAME
The ultimatum game involves two players. The players are told the amount they are to allocate between themselves, $A. The "Proposer" acts first and nominates the amount that she wants, $X. The "Responder" then can either accept the offer in which case he receives $A-$X and the Proposer receives $X or he can reject the offer in which case both players receive $0. There is only one offer made and the Responder only gets to respond once.
Standard game theory assumes that participants play with the sole aim of maximizing their payoffs. As such, it predicts that the Responder should be willing to accept any amount larger than $0. Knowing this, the Proposer should take just a little less than the whole pie for herself. The subgame perfect equilibrium is thus an allocation of ( A -E, E ) .
However, the standard result from ultimatum games played in the U.S. for moderate amounts of money (typically $10 to $15) is that the Proposer will often offer as much as 40% to the Responder. There are many 50:50 splits and there are frequent rejections of small offers. See Thaler [1988] and Camerer and Thaler [ 19951 for a detailed review of the ultimatum game literature.
Ill. THE ROLE OF STAKES

Theory
The experimental results of the ultimatum game constitute a rejection of the joint hypothesis of payoff maximization and subgame perfection. One response has been to develop models that incorporate fairness and reciprocity in utility functions. Rabin [ 19941 constructs a game-theoretic model in which each player puts a premium on fairness. The outcome is a set of "mutual-max" and "mutual-min" outcomes, or "fairness equilibria" which involve punishing someone who is unfair and rewarding someone who is fair. Rabin's model predicts a reversion to the Nash-equilibria as stakes increase. In the ultimatum game, however, every (offer, accept) outcome is a Nash equilibrium. His model thus makes no prediction as to the effect of increasing the stakes on Proposer behavior in ultimatum games. It however predicts that there will be no rejection of small offers once the stakes become arbitrarily large.
Telser [ 19951 develops an informal model which predicts that as the stakes increase, Responders will become more willing to accept a given percentage offer. He asks the reader to consider an ultimatum game in which the sum to be divided is $10 million. While a Responder may have been willing to forego a 0.01% offer of one penny in a $10 game, it is not so clear that the same Responder would be prepared to reject the equivalent percentage offer of $1000 in the $10 million game. The model is couched in terms of the law of demand: as the stakes increase the price of fairness increases and hence the quantity demanded decreases.
If Responders react to increased stakes by being more willing to accept a given percentage offer, then the optimal response of Proposers is to offer a smaller percentage of the pie. However, this argument abstracts from the issue of risk. Neither of the above models explicitly model the uncertainty faced by the Proposer. Unlike Responders, Proposers face a risk-return tradeoff. Making a lower offer increases the Proposer's potential monetary gain but also increases the risk of rejection. Proposers' risk attitudes may thus determine their behavior. Proposers may prefer to reduce the risk of rejection when the stakes are higher, a condition defined in Menezes and Hanson [ 19701 
IV. PROCEDURAL DETAILS
Experiments were conducted with students in the Faculty of Sociology and Politics at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, Central Java. The desired sample size was 40 pairs in each trial; however, class sizes varied with the result that some sessions fell slightly short of this. The English language instructions were translated into Indonesian and then translated back into English to check for any errors. All instructions and explanations were written, thus minimizing the amount of verbal communication. A pretest of 15 pairs of students was run to guard against problems during the real games.
The English language versions are available from the author on request. The games were played in almost complete silence, with the students sitting at least one seat apart from one another. At the start of each session, two examples were given and the students were 6. Hoffman et al. [I9961 conclude that rejection rates decrease as the stakes increase on the basis of one less rejection (sample size of 26) in the US$lOO game compared to the U S 1 0 game. They do not control for offers received or player heterogeneity, and do not test the significance of the difference.
asked to respond as a group as to how much each player would receive if the Responder accepted the offer and how much if the offer was rejected. The same two examples were used in all sessions.
The instructions stated that the game was anonymous and that they would never play the same person twice. The Proposers sat on one side of the room and the Responders on the other. No player played in more than one session and each session consisted of two rounds. They were told at the start only that there would be "a number of' rounds.' The Indonesian currency is the Rupiah and all players received a flat rate of Rp5000 ($US=Rp2160) for playing in addition to any takings in the real money games. Three real money sessions were conducted. The first round in each session was always for Rp5000 and the second round was for the same or an increased amount. In those games where the stakes increased in the second round, participants were not told that this would be the case until the start of that round. The advantage of allowing players to play twice is that it allows one to compare individuals' behavior across rounds and so, unlike many similar analyses of experiments, it is possible to control for the large amount of player heterogeneity that is typical of such experiments. The analysis below will focus on the differences between offers and responses in the two rounds of each game. The one game in which players played for the same amount, Rp5000, makes it possible to separate out the effect of experience and the effect of the increase in the stakes. In addition to the real money games, one hypothetical game was played. Table I shows the details of the different sessions.
According to self-reports from the subjects, the largest stake used, Rp200,000, is about three times the average monthly expenditure of the participants. This is much higher than the largest amounts used in previous ultimatum game studies.
V. RESULTS
Proposer Behavior
Real Money Games. The results of the games are shown in Figures 1 , 2, 3 and 4 7. This avoids possible changes in behaviour in a preannounced final round. In a small number of cases the Responder filled in an incorrect answer to the question "How much will you receive if you accept?". In these cases it was assumed that the Responder did not understand the game fully and so the response is marked as a problem (crossed area) rather than as an acceptance or rejection. The first result is that the low stakes (Rp5000) Indonesian games are not significantly different from the results commonly observed in the United States. The Rp5000 amount was chosen because it has approximately the same purchasing power as $10 to $15 in the U.S. (although it is a much larger share of average earnings).* The mode of the pooled Round 1 Indonesian offers is 40%, the mean is 43% and there are frequent rejections of small offers. A Mann-Whitney nonparametric test does not reject the null hypothesis that these results are the same as the US$IO results reported in Roth et al. [ 199 13 and in Hoffman, McCabe and Smith [ 19961, with p-values of 0.25 1 and 0.625 respectively. Comparisons of the acceptance rates also fail to find significant differences between the Indonesian and U.S. responses @-values of 0.698 and 0.144).9
Figures 2 and 3 show the results for Games 2 and 3, respectively. These figures indicate a slight shift toward more equal offers in the higher stakes round. However, comparisons of 8. In terms of purchasing power, the World Bank [ 19941 estimates that US$I in Indonesia buys as much as $4.40 in the US.
9. Those interested in such cross-cultural comparisons should see Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara and Zamir [1991] , a study which reports the results of playing the ultimatum game and a comparable market experiment in four countries. The authors find some differences in bargaining behavior but not in market behavior.
Rounds 1 and 2 within games reflect the effect of two factors: the increase in the stakes and the learning or experience effect. For that reason, in Game l the students played for the same amount Rp5000 in both rounds. The results of Game 1 can then be used as a control for the effect of learning.1° The experimental design makes it possible to examine the effect of stakes in three ways. First, across games (comparing Round 2 in Games 1, 2, and 3); second, within games (comparing Rounds 1 and 2 within each game); and third within player (comparing the change in individuals' behavior between Rounds 1 and 2 in each game). Table I1 reports the summary statistics depicted in the figures.
Across Game Tests.
If it is established that there are no significant differences across the groups of players in the different games, the test for the influence of stakes can simply compare the distribution of offers in Round 2 of Games 1, 2 and 3. Painvise Mann-Whitney tests do not reject the null hypothesis that the Round 1 real money game distributions of offers were the same at the conventional a = .05 level. @-values: Game 1 vs. 2, 0.701; Game 2 vs. 3,0.079; Game 1 vs. 3,0.068). In Round 2 when the stakes differed across the games, the null hypothesis of equality of the distributions could also not be rejected (p-values: Game 1 vs. 2, 0.396; Game 2 vs. 3, 0.380; Game 1 vs. 3, 0.846). These results suggest that Proposer behavior is invariant to stakes." 10. Note that the first rounds of Games 1, 2 and 3 are identical in all respects. That is, participants in Games 2 and 3 did not know that they would be playing for higher stakes in the second round.
11. Although no significant player heterogeneity was detected at the .05 level, the marginally significant p-values for the Round 1 comparison of Games 1 and 3 and Games 2 and 3 when coupled with the relatively weak power of the Mann-Whitney test suggest that player heterogeneity may play a role. A more powerful test would thus control for player heterogeneity by conducting within game and within player comparisons. Within Game Tests. Mann-Whitney tests across rounds are reported in Table 11 . The distributions of Proposer offers in Rounds 1 and 2 are insignificantly different from each other at the 5% level in all of the real money games (Game 1 p = 0.389, Game 2 p = 0.873 and Game 3 p = 0.085).'* Within Player Tests. Table 111 presents the results of differences-in-differences tests across the three games. The differences in individual proposers' Round 1 and Round 2 offer proportions are calculated (Round 2 minus Round 1). The average and standard deviation of these differences are calculated for each game and are tested to assess whether they differ across games. Table 111 shows that the mean differences in Proposer percentage offers are positive in both Games 2 and 3, indicating that on average, offers became more generous 12. Tests of population proportions were also conducted. There is a statistically significant decrease in low offers from Round 1 to Round 2 in the games in which the stakes increased, whereas in Game 1 (where the stakes are constant across the two rounds) there is no such decrease in the number of offers at the low end of the range. In Game 2 the number of offers less than 20% fell significantly fiom 5 (14.3%) in Round 1 to zero in Round 2 (p = 0.020). The pattern is similar and more dramatic in Game 3. The number of offers for amounts less than 40% decreased significantly from 25 (67.6%) to 15 (40.5%), (p = O.OlO), and offers less than 20% fell from 9 (24.3%) to 3 (8.1%), (p = 0.022).
FIGURE 1 Game 1 Proposer and Responder Behavior
from Round I to Round 2. In contrast, the Game 1 mean difference is negative. However, painvise t-tests do not reject the null hypothesis of no significant differences in the mean Round 1 to 2 differences across games at the a = .05 level. The p-value for Game 1 versus Game 2 is 0.141, for Game 1 versus 3 is 0.053 and for Game 2 versus Came 3 is 0.632. The F-test of equality across all three games also cannot be rejected. The standard deviation of differences between Round 1 and Round 2 offers is significantly lower in both Games 2 and 3 relative to Game 1. This indicates that there is a much greater variation in changes in percentage offers between rounds when the stakes remain constant and low than when they increase.
To summarize, the examination of Proposer behavior in the real money games does not show any movement towards the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome as the stakes increase. In fact, across game, within game and within player comparisons almost uniformly conclude that Proposer behavior is invariant to stake changes.I3 The changes in percentage offers between Rounds 1 and 2 are 13. The tests of population proportions detected statistically significant movement away from the game-theoretic wealth maximizing proposals when the stakes increase. also significantly more uniform when the stakes increase than when the stakes are constant, perhaps signifying a more shared reaction of Proposers to the increase in stakes. Figure 4 presents the results of the hypothetical games. A comparison of Figures 3 and  4 can be used to examine the effect of using real money as opposed to playing hypothetically. The figures show no obvious differences in the overall distribution of offers. MannWhitney tests do not reject the null hypothesis that the distributions are the same in the real money and hypothetical game (p-values of 0.445 in Round 1 and 0.498 in Round 2). Table 111 shows that the difference in mean differences between Round 1 and Round 2 offers in the real and hypothetical games is not significant. l4 However, the standard deviation of the changes in percentage offers between Round 1 and Round 2 is much greater in the hypothetical game than in the real money game.
Real Money versus Hypothetical Money
Thus, the above analysis of Proposer behavior produces the following results:
1. With respect to the real money results, the evidence lends no support to the specula-14. Also, unlike the real money game, the proportion of Proposers who offer less than 20% does not decrease significantly when the hypothetical stakes are increased.
tion that proposals might move closer to the game-theoretic predictions as the stakes increase.
2. With respect to the hypothetical results, the null hypothesis that the distributions of offers are the same in the real money and hypothetical game cannot be rejected. Table I1 shows the acceptance rates in each round of each game which are defined as the percentage of offers that are accepted by Res p o n d e r~.~~ The acceptance rates are much lower in the hypothetical game than in the real money game. Acceptance rates also increase as stakes increase in the real money games. This cannot however be taken to indicate that Responders are more willing to accept a given percentage offer at higher stakes.I6 As we have seen above, there is evidence suggestive that some offers may have become more gen- 16. Even though the acceptance rates are much smaller in the higher stakes rounds, there were still some surprising rejections in the high stakes games that show a significant divergence from game-theoretic behavior. For example, one individual in Game 3 gave up Rp41,OOO by rejecting an offer. His response to the expenditure question on the questionnaire identifies him as someone in the lowest expenditure category which makes the Rp41,OOO approximately equivalent to his average monthly expenditure. erous as the stakes increased, which may explain why we see more acceptances. In other words, it may be that the more generous offers (and not a greater willingness of Responders to accept a given percentage offer) explain the higher acceptance rates in the higher stakes games. Table IV presents the regression results that test the significance of these differences in rejection behavior. l 7 The dependent variable equals 1 if the offer was accepted, and 0 if it was rejected. It is regressed on the offer share received from the Proposer and the 17. Table IV reports results obtained from a Linear Probability Model (LPM). A probit model was also estimated and its statistical results were almost identical. The LPM model results are reported because they produce coefficients that can be interpreted in terms of probabilities. dummy variables, A l , A2, A3, hypl, and hyp2, defined as follows: The coefficients on the variables A l , A2, and A3 represent the average probability of acceptance of a given percentage offer in Round 2 of each of Games 1 , 2 and 3 relative to a first round real money game. The coefficients on hypl and hyp2 capture the probability of acceptance in Rounds 1 and 2 respectively of the hypothetical game relative to the first round real money game. For example, a player is 26.15% more likely to reject a given percentage offer in the first round of the hy-pothetical game than in the first round of a real money game. Random effects are used to control for player heter~geneity.'~ The F-test of equality of the coefficients on A1 , A2 and A3 shows that the differences between the probabilities of acceptance of a given percentage offer in the real money games are statistically insignificant (p-value = 0.1 82).19 However a one-tailed t-test of the null hypothesis that A1 = A3 against the alternative hypothesis that A1 < A3 rejects the equality of the coefficients with a p-value of 0.045. The same test of A1 = A2 narrowly fails to reject equality at p = 0.063. The insignificant F-test of equality across all three games is thus heavily influenced by the similarity between Responder behavior in the two higher stakes games (A2 and A3), not between responder behavior in the low stakes games and the higher stakes games.
Responder Behavior
The acceptance rates in the hypothetical game (Game 4) are significantly lower than in Game 3 (p < .001 in both Round 1 and Round 2). There is no significant difference in the rejection rate as the hypothetical stakes increase in Game 4 (p-value = 0.678).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The experiments in this paper do not support the speculation that the rejection of game-theory predictions in the experimental setting of the ultimatum game is an artifact of small stakes. Significant deviations from game-theoretic behavior persist even in highstakes games. There is no evidence of any movement in Proposer behavior towards the predicted game-theoretic outcome as the monetary stakes increase. However, the results do suggest that Responders react to higher stakes by becoming more willing to accept a given 19. Note that the coefficient on Al captures the "learning" effect. The coefficients on A2 and A3 capture the learning effect and the effect of increased stakes. The test of the null hypothesis, A l = A3, for example, can be rewritten as Ho: A3-Al = 0. This nets out the learning effect and tests whether the stake effect is statistically significant. In contrast, tests of significance of the individual coefficients, A2 and A3 are within game comparisons. They do not control for learning and so are not able to examine the statistical significance of the stake effect.
percentage offer. These differing reactions of Proposers and Responders may reflect the reaction of Proposers to the risk of losing a greater absolute amount. Proposers must juggle the conflicting pressures of potentially greater gain versus the risk of loss. If a Proposer's utility function is characterized by increasing partial risk aversion, hidher optimal response to increased stakes may not be to offer less. In contrast, Responders face a more transparent decision where rejecting a positive offer means foregoing a monetary payoff with certainty. In higher stakes games a rejection of a given percentage offer involves foregoing a much larger absolute sum.
The dictator game, in which the Responder must accept the Proposer's offer, eliminates the risk faced by the Proposer and allows one to examine Proposers' tastes for fairness directly. Playing the dictator game with very high stakes would be an interesting extension for further research.
Game theoretic models such as Rabin [ 19941'' that incorporate fairness and reciprocity in a game-theoretic setting are also promising avenues of research. Rabin's model predicts a reversion to the Nash-equilibria as stakes increase. As mentioned above, every (offer, accept) outcome is a Nash equilibrium in the ultimatum game. Rabin's model is thus not troubled by the invariance of Proposer behavior. The persistence of rejections at high stakes does however raise the question as to how high the stakes need be in order to compel the reversion to Nash equilibria.
In addition to looking at the effect of increasing the stakes from small amounts of real money to larger amounts of real money, the difference between playing with real stakes and playing for hypothetical stakes was examined. When the stakes were hypothetical, there was significantly greater variation in Proposer behavior and Responders rejected proposals significantly more often. It is thus necessary to use real stakes when analyzing behavior in the framework of the ultimatum game. [1991] .
And similarly Bolton
